

## Book Review

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Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri: *Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider's Account of Pakistan's Foreign Relations Including Details of the Kashmir Framework*,  
Oxford University Press, 2015,  
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The author is a former foreign Minister and an eminent Pakistani politician with a rich socio-cultural background. His ancestors have played a significant role in the freedom struggle in British India; and his family, especially Mrs. Nasreen Kasuri, has made a remarkable contribution for the promotion of education, generating employment for millions and making a great deal of efforts for women empowerment in Pakistan. The Kasuri family has also played a prominent role for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. It is not surprising that in a background chapter of his book, the author rightfully mentions that Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy in India, 'was more interested in cutting and running away from India than saving precious Indian lives at the time of Partition.' And that under Mountbatten's influence, the Partition Plan and the Radcliffe Award were changed at the eleventh hour.

This book is a very valuable contribution towards the existing knowledge on Pakistan's foreign relations because the author has provided a wealth of information for policy-makers, teachers, students, researchers as well as for the ordinary readers. The major portion of this voluminous book is based on the firsthand knowledge on the subjects of discussion. Khurshid Kasuri has recorded history with an unbiased mind; he has been extremely

generous in giving credit to every deserving player, even to his political adversaries. The author has meticulously followed the principles and practices for presenting an authentic research work. After using the original and primary sources, the author has acknowledged and quoted the very best and celebrated printed books and sources. As foreign minister of Pakistan, Mr. Kasuri had been personally engaged in very many high-level negotiations for five years, 2002-07. It was during his tenure as foreign minister that Pakistan was able to make a great deal of improvement in its relations not only with its neighbors but also with the major World Powers and the Muslim World.

Some startling revelations, the reader finds in the book are: that due to the marathon negotiations on the Kashmir Dispute, at one point both Pakistan and India were very close to an agreement. But due to some unavoidable happenings in India and Pakistan, an agreement could not be finalized. The author believes that 'the cause of Kashmir has a strong legal and moral foundation and therefore acts of violence would not help advance that cause.' He is against militancy, radicalization and extremism, he argues: 'Pakistan will have few friends left in the neighborhood and will be isolated internationally and polarized internally if it does not make serious efforts to wean the militants away from their activities.' He also writes that Sir Creek problem was also almost resolved and it was ready for signatures. That at one point Mr. Kasuri tried to convince Gen. Musharraf to relinquish his military uniform and contest the election as a civilian. That during one of his visits to China, the author 'became the first non-Chinese leader ever to be taken to a top secret Chinese space facility'. Mentioning the US relations with Iran, the author writes that he was asked to play a role in bringing USA and Iran closer; that the then Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, sent a message to Iran through him. Writing in great details on rapprochement between India and Pakistan, the author discusses in details as to why did the Agra Summit fail to achieve its true objectives? He has given details of positive and negative roles played by various parties during the negotiations in Agra and the reasons as to why

did India demonize Musharraf after the Kargil episode and then the same person became their favorite to the extent that India would have liked him to remain in uniform believing that it would facilitate a deal between the two countries. The author writes that 'the general thinking in India's establishment was that Musharraf was guiding Pakistan towards a liberal and progressive future.'

The author argues that due to his close contacts with his Indian counterparts, the negotiation process between the two countries had made good deal of progress; and that both 'India and Pakistan were moving away from conflict management towards a more serious and appropriate conflict resolution process.' Commenting on the negotiation process, the author writes 'the value of dialogue can never be underestimated. The many rounds of dialogue that took place during our time were successful. It is not that we were making progress in every single meeting on every issue but we were definitely learning about each other.' As for his personal observations, the author found Indian foreign minister Natwar Singh a warm-hearted and sophisticated person with a deep sense of history.

Further on the same issue, the author candidly gives his recommendations such as: That the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan are not only in the best interests of these countries but also in the larger interests of the poor and deprived people of South Asia. He has analyzed the challenges faced by South Asia, the poorest and most backward region of the World. Similarly, the author has very objectively discussed the major wars and mini war in Kargil between India and Pakistan and has come to the conclusion that the war was not an option and there was no substitute for talks. The author's message or perhaps advice to India is: India was economically developing with a good deal of speed therefore her economic progress will suffer if it continued confrontation with Pakistan. And more importantly that due to its hostile policies against Pakistan, India will not be able to play its due role in international affairs.

As a guideline for future policymakers, the author suggests that for India-Pakistan talks, proper homework and well in advance preparations are always necessary. Most important is that in order to resolve all outstanding issues, the government in power and the opposition parties must be on one page; he has presented his recommendations in great details and has highlighted the importance of a bipartisan support for resolving major Indo-Pakistan disputes. The author has more notably, in this direction, initiated a new trend of thinking in the foreign office that there is a need to engage not only with officials but also with important members of civil society in both India and Pakistan.

As regards the role of US role in the Indo-Pakistan peace process, the author points out that when he assumed office as foreign Minister, 'the Americans had been working behind the scenes to ease the tension which existed between India and Pakistan.' That Pakistan's militant support for the Kashmir cause at that point would have damaged the Kashmir cause and also created a rift with US. He says that the then US secretary of State, Colin Powell, had worked on both sides of the border for the normalization of India-Pakistan relations; and that the Bush administration continued in the same direction with both US Secretaries of State Powell and Dr. Rice.

Writing on the role of Pakistan Army on Indo-Pakistan talks, the author writes that the Army was completely on board during his tenure for 'it understands quite clearly the relationship between the country's economy, defense and foreign policy. That a strong defense is underpinned by a strong economy, and not the other way around.' The author has also given details of 'his first-hand experience of dealing with some of the senior-most army officers' – also addressing officers at the NDU (National Defense University) and Staff College Quetta.

Under the title 'the way forward' between India and Pakistan, the author perhaps gives his advice to the warmongers and the opponents of peace process between India and Pakistan in a subtle way: 'removing or reducing the yawning trust deficit will

undoubtedly promote normalization of relations and help guide the peace process to its logical conclusion. It is essential that Pakistan and India try to enlarge areas of common and converging interests.' He gives examples of old times when marriage alliance among the royalty ended wars and prompted peace in Europe and in the Mughal India. He has pointed out clearly that historical animosities could be removed by creating interdependence and increasing the number of stakeholders whose interests demand that the countries remain peaceful. The author quotes John Stuart Mill saying that 'it is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it. Even if one is skeptical of grandiose philosophical claims, it is undeniable that by creating mutual understanding and interdependence, trade promotes cooperation and friendly relations between nations. Examples of the EU model of relationship between its member countries have been cited.

Quoting another celebrated author – Charles Kupchan, the author writes: 'Stable peace is possible. Enemies do become friends. When adversaries settle their differences and replace rivalry with cooperation, they succeed in leaving behind conflict and expanding the footprint of peace. This finding is an inspirational impression and suggests that there is an alternative to the destructive wars that have so darkened the course of history. It is pointed out that 'given the increasing importance of trade, business and investment in today's world, economic factors are acquiring greater weight in foreign policy considerations.' Examples of China-India trade relations have been cited in this regard. The author is not convinced that 'free trade with a much larger economy like India would hurt Pakistan's economic interest because on a level playing field Pakistan's businessmen are second to none. Pakistan already has a free trade agreement with China whose economy is many times larger than India's. If our business and industry can survive that, we should have little to fear from MFN-based trade relations with India.' He recommends the formation of Pakistan-India Joint Business Forum to enforce a

balance in trade and provide a level playing field. The author believes that 'the real hurdle to Pakistan-India trade liberalization is unpredictability of their relations due to their political disputes and not just a presumed threat from a larger Indian economy.' Here he gives examples of trade relations, despite hostile relations at times, between France and Germany, India and China, China and Japan, US and China and US and Vietnam.

The author suggests that like the ASEAN and the EU, SAARC should also have an effective dispute resolution mechanism. However, he thinks that SAARC Summit Meetings have been useful; that the useful role of these meetings in bringing Pakistan and India closer in crucial times should not be ignored. Similarly, Media on both sides of the border 'could also play a role in influencing public opinion'; a tie-up model is described by the Author as 'promising'. He writes that 'tensions between India and Pakistan could be better handled by the media. Napoleon is quoted: 'four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets'; the author has 'adopted an open-door policy towards both Pakistani and Indian media.'

Simplification of existing Indo-Pakistan visa rules is recommended by the author, especially for 'serving and retired officials above a certain rank, lawyers, doctors, students and other professionals and for those paying a certain level of income tax'; this policy will 'encourage the new generation of Pakistani and Indians to stop thinking stereotypically each other.' He also recommends cross-border visits by sportsmen, artists, poets, writers and musicians to promote cultural activities 'which can go long way towards blunting adversarial feelings.' The author has 'appealed to the film industry not to produce hate movies.' Very passionately, the author writes: 'Pakistan-India relationship has suffered as a result of several missed opportunities. This should not be allowed to happen again. The future of the bilateral relationship must be guided by constant engagement and cautious optimism as the two countries move towards a new model of an inter-state relationship based on regional cooperation and fair competition, and not distrust and suspicion fueled by counter-

reactive moves and a zero sum approach. Moving forward, by emphasizing common challenges and promoting regional cooperation, Pakistan and India must overcome political challenges to adopt a positive-sum approach.'

In a separate chapter on "Pakistan and the United States" the author has discussed his first visit to the US in Jan-Feb 2003. He met 'almost everybody who mattered in the US. It was a record that he had 76 high-level interactions'. He tried to convince the US administration that 'Pakistan was fully abiding by its commitment in terms of preventing export of nuclear technology.' As regards the issue of terrorism, Mr. Kasuri has 'underlined the political and economic cost to Pakistan that cooperation with the US in the war against terrorism entailed and which necessitated American political and economic support to Pakistan – also enhancing mutual trust in bilateral relations.' As for Pakistan supporting the US on the war against Saddam Hussein, Kasuri expressed his apprehensions on using force against Iraq. Regarding WMDs, he has mentioned that 'Rumsfeld asserted firmly that the question was not of discovering anything, but whether Iraq was ready to cooperate.' The author mentions that 'Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were among the most influential members of the Bush administration'. Kasuri had calculated that with UN or without UN support, US will definitely attack Iraq. On Afghanistan, the US vice president, Joe Biden, told Kasuri that the US administration 'had made a mess of Afghanistan'.

The author however forcefully raised the issue of Pakistani prisoners in Guantanamo Bay and was able to secure the release of many detainees. On the A. Q. Khan affair, Kasuri argued that Khan was not subject to Government accountability; that he 'used his freedom of unchecked movement to transfer sensitive nuclear technology to some countries such as Iran, Libya and North Korea'; that US National security Adviser, Stephen Hedley, told him that 'great gaps in facts still remained – which needed to be answered.' On this issue, information was shared with China and Japan was also briefed. He further adds: 'We tried to restore Pakistan's credibility by follow-up actions to reassure the world

something like this would never happen again. We were able to contain the damage because of diplomatic efforts as well as the fact that Pakistan had been conducting a proactive foreign policy and enjoyed good relations with major world powers -- Khan's network was dismantled and he was made to apologize to the nation, although we had to pay a heavy price in political as well as domestic terms.' In an interview for *The Washington Post*, Kasuri argued that A.Q.Khan's act was an individual act and that Pakistan's Government or any of its agencies had no part to play in it.' The author is delighted to mention that due to his efforts; Jim Hoagland (associate editor of *The Washington Post*) published a piece in favor of Kasuri's argument on the issue.

On the issue of Iran-US relations, the author argues that the 'Iranian nuclear issue had assumed an alarming proposition. A section in the US obviously backed by the Israeli lobby wanted to ensure that Iran should never become a nuclear power... Although we were extremely disturbed by the A.Q.Khan scandal, I tried to sensitize the American and European leadership to the dangers of attacking Iran and of the negative consequences for sectarian harmony in Pakistan if Iran were attacked... I attempted hard to convince the US leaders that the use of force against Iran would have negative consequences. I attempted to sensitize both the US and Iranian to avoid brinkmanship... I was asked by both Iranian and the EU representatives to try and bridge their differences on this issue.' Similarly, on the issue of 'Bombing of Lebanon, Kasuri delivered an emotional speech urging the US to pressurizing the Israelis to put an end to their attacks on civilians.' He says that his speech had a great impact; that it was during his tenure that the US was giving a great deal of importance to Pakistan leading to Pakistan becoming a Major Non-NATO Ally. It was during the tenure of Kasuri that the US administration planned to notify the Congress about the supply of F-16 Aircraft to Pakistan. Bush promised early delivery of the overhauled and new ones. 'This deal had great psychological significance, the author says. It indicated that relations between the US and



Pakistan were moving towards betterment, and also that the US had finally accepted Pakistan's status as a nuclear power.

On the issue of terrorism, the author says that Pakistan faced difficulties in its relations with the US. There were allegations by India, Afghanistan and the US that Pakistan was not taking appropriate measures to stop cross-border terrorism and at times also accused of 'double-dealing'. The author writes that: 'our counter-narrative underscored that the international community expected too much and too soon from Pakistan. The US had been essentially asking Pakistan to deliver what was undeliverable. Many in Europe were recognizing that defense, diplomacy and development needed to be synergistically applied as a part of the holistic Afghan strategy. Some strong sections of public opinion in Pakistan also stressed that a resolution of the Kashmir issue would help release positive energy to address regional problems more effectively and create a better atmosphere for Pak-US cooperation.' In the meantime, Kasuri had also been asking the high-ups 'that the struggle against terrorism cannot be won through military means alone and that the root causes of terrorism also needed to be effectively addressed. The US did not like what I said; at that time it seemed allergic to any reference to 'root causes' which it interpreted as justifications for terrorism.' He says that the then Government had not given any permission to the US for Drone Attacks; only surveillance and reconnaissance missions were allowed – not to launch missile attacks – as later PM Gilani also confirmed. Kasuri argues that drone attacks had undermined Pakistan-US cooperation in counterterrorism and been counterproductive.

Khurshid Kasuri did his utmost to 'interact with the international media and think-tanks to put across Pakistan's concerns and priorities to combat a barrage of criticism.' He quotes Kissinger: "being America's ally can be more dangerous than being its enemy". Hillary Clinton is also quoted as saying that 'she acknowledged the US role in creating the problems that afflict Pakistan today. She rightly pointed out that the Pakistani people sensed being used by the Americans. He has also quoted

'popular perception in Pakistan and some conspiracy theories that US is responsible for all problems in Pakistan and that America is trying to destabilize Pakistan by using various means. As Foreign Minister, Kasuri did all he could to improve Pakistan's image; he highlighted the progress made on gender and minority issues regardless of difficulties and setbacks; and argued that Pakistan 'has suffered huge human and material losses following its discussion to support US after 9/11, which no amount of American aid can ever compensate.'

He also mentions some events like the Raymond Davis issue, killing of Usama Bin Laden and killing of Pakistani soldiers at Salala check-post, evacuation of Shamsi air base, closure of NATO supplies, language of the Kerry-Lugar Bill, the 'Memogate' scandal and Clinton's apology which plunged the relationship to all time low. However, the two countries, the author says, have since 'realized the need to cooperate more than ever now, as the US forces near the drawdown in Afghanistan. Pakistan and the US need to recognize that it is in their mutual interests to help stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Many American thinkers have also started advising the US administration that Pakistan is too important a country, with a huge nuclear arsenal, to be looked at only from the perspective of Afghanistan. Kasuri argues that 'one of the major successes of Pakistan's foreign policy over the last five decades has been its ability to maintain strong relations with both US and China. There are areas of convergence between the US, Pakistan and China; the most important would seem to be their common interest in promoting peace in Afghanistan.' Richard Holbrooke, US special envoy on Afghanistan, was 'keen to forge a strategic partnership with Pakistan on the same lines as with China and India and not perpetuate a transitional relationship based on military and economic aid but also on commonality of strategic interests or perceptions on key issues of mutual concerns. Holbrooke correctly figured out that the key to ending the Afghan war was not the defeat of the Taliban on the battlefield but a change in Pakistan's strategic calculus by helping its masses achieve upward economic mobility. He rightly felt that the US

needed to engage in a dialogue with Pakistan more; this engagement has to be more broad-based.' The author mentions various ups and downs, engagement and estrangement and concludes this chapter by saying that US-Pakistan relationship should be broad-based, meaningful and productive.

Ever since Obama announced in May 2014 that there will be a total withdrawal of US troops by 2016, Afghanistan became deeply important especially for India and Pakistan and for the world in general. For the US the cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would be more than 4.4 trillion dollars. And it remained a very crucial issue throughout Khurshid Kasuri's tenure of office; his first visit took place within a few days after assuming office in 2002 and next in 2003. He noticed that 'Pakistan's image had taken a further beating because Government and media in that country blamed Pakistan for all terrorist acts. Afghanistan was assured by the author that Pakistan will not allow its territory to be used for launching terrorist activities. But allegations continued; that the Taliban were doing their planning in Quetta; Musharraf was pursuing a policy of 'double dealing'; that Pakistan was planning to have 'strategic depth' to be used in case of a future war with India. Kasuri pointed out that 'Pakistan did not need strategic depth in geographical terms because Baluchistan provided that depth to Pakistan.' That Pakistan was deeply concerned due to growing Indian footprint in Afghanistan including a pledge of investing \$2 billion and regarding the activities of Indian Consulates adjacent to Pakistani territories where they had no economic interests. Musharraf also gave Karzai an intelligence report saying that Afghanistan was trying to stir trouble in Pakistan.

That Pakistani rebels like Brahamdagh Bugti who were involved in insurgency in Baluchistan were given sanctuaries in Afghanistan; that India was instigating an uprising in Baluchistan from Afghanistan. Kasuri 'offered to fence the border and even seal and mine it' but neither the Afghan Government nor the US approved his plan. Author's assessment is that Karzai was critical of Pakistan because of 'poor governance, corruption and drug

trade' in Afghanistan. But despite that all, the author maintains that Pakistan should do its utmost for peace and stability in Afghanistan; that who rules that country should be their internal matter; and that Pakistan's foreign office, Army and agencies support that contention. Highlighting the importance of Pakistan as problem-solver he writes: 'There is recognition by all sides that Pakistan has the ability to help ensure a final settlement or to sabotage one.' Kasuri argues: 'The challenges confronting Pakistan call for an imaginative, honest and competent leadership to put its house in order and hold a dialogue and build consensus amongst the various stakeholders in the country on the issue of terrorism.' That addressing the needs of youth and economic development is essential. He appreciates the recent changes of attitudes in Afghanistan, launching of *Zarb-e-Azb* and that now China and US are also on the same page regarding the Afghanistan issue.

In his chapter titled "Interrupted Symphony" the author discusses the Kashmir dispute in great details; he argues that 'the formula that Pakistan and India worked out between 2004-7, after detailed negotiations on the backchannel spread over dozens of meetings, had greater chances of acceptability. The very fact that over these three years of intense negotiations, all possible objections and reservations were voiced and resolved held an assurance that there was a good chance of its acceptance by a large majority of Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis. It is for this reason that I have said repeatedly that we don't have to invent the wheel and negotiations must start from where we left off. I don't mind that a new government would like to put its own name plate on it.' He has underscored the need for flexibility and restraint by all sides in order to have a negotiated settlement; that it is the duty of leadership to be courageous where new policies have to be formulated, particularly in sensitive areas like India-Pakistan relations. It is courage which enables leaders to expend the political capital that is required to move along a road less travelled.'

Khurshid Kasuri has discussed the 'contours of the agreement on Kashmir' quoting Henry Kissinger that 'the test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction'; that both sides reduce armed forces, reduce violence in Occupied Kashmir, De-radicalization, Disengagement and Rehabilitation (DDR). The author has discussed the consequences of radicalization that has exposed to Pakistan to violence and terrorism also quoting Army Chief saying that the biggest threat was not external but internal. In this chapter, several proposals by Gen. Musharraf to resolve this dispute have also been discussed but it has been denied that any U-turn on this dispute had been taken by Musharraf Government.

In conclusion, autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, diaries and books published by distinguished personalities in a society, also holding high positions and involved in decision-making, have always been regarded as extremely important for learning lessons from history. This book is based on firsthand knowledge, numerous primary and secondary sources, varied knowledge, speculative mind and thoroughness. It is therefore highly recommended for policy-makers, researchers, teachers and students of Political Science, History, Civilizational Studies and International Relations as well as for general readers.